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MIXED MOTIVES: REGARDING RACE AND 
RACIAL FORTUITY 
SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES 
FOR RACIAL REFORM. By Derrick Bell. 1 Oxford 
University Press. 2004. Pp. 230. Hardback, $25.00, Paper, 
$14.95. 
Kathleen A. Bergin2 
I INTRODUCTION 
In April 2006, the Nebraska state legislature passed the 
Learning Community Reorganization Act to improve the falter-
ing educational system in Omaha City.3 Rejecting a bid to merge 
majority-white suburban districts with the mostly minority city 
schools,4 the legislature instead voted to divide the formerly uni-
fied Omaha City School System into three separate and 
autonomous school districts.5 The perimeter of each new district 
would track existing residential attendance zones used to deter-
mine enrollment in local high schools under the unified system.6 
As a result, the racial composition of the student body at any 
one school within Omaha City would likely change little, if at all, 
under the reconstituted plan. Nearly every school in the city could 
1. Visiting Professor of Law, New York University Law School. 
2. Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law. J.D., University of Baltimore; 
LL.M., New York University. Special thanks to Derrick Bell, Brian Bix and Shelby A.D. 
Moore for helpful comments that improved this review. 
3. 2006 Neb. Laws 1024, §§ 28-41. 
4. See News Hour: Plan for Omaha Schools Raises Segregation Concerns (PBS 
television broadcast May 31, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb 
/education/jan-june06/omaha_05-3l.html (hereinafter News Hour]. 
5. !d.; see also Megan Tady, 'Re-segregated' Omaha Schools to be Separate, Not 
Equal, THE NEW STANDARD, Apr. 21, 2006, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index. 
cfrnlitems/3082. 
6. 2006 Neb. Laws 1024, § 41; see also Scott Bauer, Omaha Schools Split along 
Race Lines, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.boston.cornlnews/nation/ 
articles/2006/04/13/omaha_schools_split_along_race_lines. 
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very well remain what each had become in 1999 when Omaha dis-
continued compliance with a judicial desegregation order: pre-
dominantly Black, largely Hispanic, or uniformly White.7 
The NAACP cried "segregation," and filed sui~ against a 
plan that it says "violat[ es] the bedrock constitutional principle" 
embodied in Brown v. Board of Education8 by creating racially 
identifiable school districts.9 But Ernie Chamber, sponsor of the 
plan and Nebraska's only Black state senator, quickly pointed 
out that Omaha schools were already segregated, and that his 
proposal did nothing more than alter the governing structure of 
existing schools by creating three new school boards and Super-
intendent positions.10 Doing so, Chambers defended, would 
likely bring about much needed improvements to the city's fal-
tering Black and Latino schools by giving minority communities 
a governing voice over educational policy. 11 
Senator Chambers will find a sympathetic ally in Derrick 
Bell, author of Silent Covenants, who views the contemporary 
status of America's schools as evidence that Brown's "current 
relevance is in doubt" (p. 131). Bell spent the better part of his 
legal career in the 1960s with the NAACP's Legal Defense 
Fund, seeking to implement Brown's landmark ruling that seg-
7. See News Hour, supra note 4. In 1975, the City of Omaha was placed under a 
court ordered desegregation plan pursuant to a finding that it had previously engaged in 
unconstitutional segregation. See United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 
1975). By 1984, the school system had obtained "unitary" status in compliance with the 
1975 order. The district court suspended judicial supervision of the school district but 
ordered that it continue to operate a unitary system. Omaha proceeded to implement the 
original desegregation plan voluntarily until1999. See Complaint, NAACP v. Heineman, 
No. 06 Civ. 371 (D. Neb. filed May 16, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
8. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
9. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 5, para. 14; see also Sam Dillon, Law to Segre-
gate Omaha Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A9, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/15/us/15omaha.html?ei=5090&en=613ee064f4b5fefa&e 
x=1302753600&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all; Kevin Tibbles, A Re-
turn to Racial Segregation in Schools?, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www. 
msnbc.msn.corn!id/12394410/frorn!RL.4. 
10. See News Hour, supra note 4; Tady, supra note 5 (quoting Chambers's comment 
that in Omaha City "you have students sitting in a segregated school in a segregated 
neighborhood asking if this bill is going to bring about segregation"). The NAACP states 
in its Complaint that the majority of Omaha's Latino and African American population 
live in segregated neighborhoods wherein students are assigned to neighborhood schools. 
Complaint, supra note 7, at 7--8, paras. 22, 27, 28. 
11. Senator Chambers stated that "[t]he real issue is one of power. We believe that 
the people whose children attend schools ought to have local control over those schools, 
a concept very familiar with white people." News Hour, supra note 4; see also James 
Wright, Omaha Plan: Is It Segregation?, BLACKPRESSUSA.COM, http://www.blackpressusa. 
corn!News/Article.asp?SID=3&Title=National+News&NewsiD=8100. 
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regated schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment (pp. 97-106). The task was formidable. 
White resistance to desegregation was so severe that Bell re-
quired the protection of federal marshalls to escort him to and 
from court. His clients were shot at, their homes firebombed, 
and he, along with them, slept under armed guard (pp. 99-103). 
At one point, Bell supervised over 300 desegregation cases si-
multaneously, pressing what he would later lament as Brown's 
misplaced "integrationist" ideal (p. 105).12 
Bell now rejects the decision he once nearly died to defend, 
maintaining in Silent Covenants that the Court should have up-
held the "separate but equal" standard established in Plessy v. 
Ferguson. 13 According to Professor Bell, the Court in Brown 
changed the constitutional status of segregated schools, but 
lacked the institutional capacity to address the culture of White 
supremacy behind those schools (pp. 94-96).14 Had he been on 
the Court in 1954, Bell would have conceded the "limits of judi-
cial authority" and cited the "predictable outraged resistance" of 
Whites as reasons for upholding segregation (p. 21). 15 At the 
same time, he would have acknowledged the "long-suppressed 
12. See also Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client In· 
terests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 516 (1976) [hereinafter Bell, 
Integration Ideals]. 
13. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
14. Professor Bell's criticism of Brown pre-dates Silent Covenants. See, e.g., Derrick 
A. Bell, Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980) (describing political and economic interests as pri-
mary motivations for promoting Black equality in Brown); Bell, Integration Ideals, supra 
note 12 (arguing that civil rights lawyers blindly pursued integration following Brown 
without considering the educational interest of their clients). Subsequent writings reiter· 
ate the view taken in Silent Covenants that Brown's contemporary impact is largely over-
stated. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (2005) ("The Brown decision, as far as the law is 
concerned, is truly dead and beyond resuscitation."); Derrick Bell, Relearning Brown: 
Applying the Lessons of Brown to the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, 29 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 633, 634 (2005) (describing Brown as "a magnificent mirage, 
the legal equivalent of that city on a hill to which all aspire without any serious thought 
that it will ever be attained"); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and 
Learning from Our Racial History, 66 U. PIIT. L. REV. 21,21 (2004) ("The Brown Deci-
sion, while never overturned, has become irrelevant."). 
15. In 2001, Professor Bell contributed to a compilation of "decisions" written by 
prominent legal scholars and civil rights activists that reflected how they would have de-
cided Brown had they sat on the bench in 1954. The authors were asked to draft their 
opinions in light of what they perceived to be the contemporary relevance and historical 
impact of Brown. Professor Bell drafted the only dissenting opinion. See Derrick A. Bell, 
Bell,]., Dissenting, in WHAT "BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION" SHOULD HAVE SAID, 
THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS 
DECISION 185-200 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bell, J., Dissenting]. That dis· 
sent is reprinted in Silent Covenants (pp. 21-27). 
274 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:271 
truth" that Plessy was seldom enforced, and would have de-
manded strict compliance with its "separate but equal" standard 
(pp. 21-24).16 This approach would have provided legal recourse 
against substandard segregated schools and spared Black chil-
dren the emotional agony and physical abuse they experienced 
from hostile Whites upon being transferred to hostile White 
schools (p. 112). Moreover, he writes, the approach would have 
ultimately led to popular support for desegregation as an eco-
nomic imperative that served the financial interests of Whites by 
cutting the costs of funding two separate school systems (pp. 24-
27).17 
This Essay reviews the critique articulated against Brown in 
Silent Covenants. Part II describes the phenomenon of "racial 
fortuity" responsible, in Professor Bell's view, for patterns of ra-
cial reform and retrenchment following Brown and other civil 
rights milestones. Within that Part, section A examines the po-
litical environment leading up to Brown, while section B dis-
cusses how this likely influenced the Justices deliberations. The 
discussion shows that Brown reflects a primary example of "in-
terest-convergence" that advanced the nation's foreign policy 
objectives without a sufficiently meaningful commitment to ra-
cial equality or educational reform. Section C examines the role 
of "racial-sacrifice" in Brown that arguably preserved public 
school segregation in practice even after the Court ruled it un-
constitutional under law. Part III situates Brown within a 
broader historical context by examining the role of racial fortuity 
in major events that both pre- and post-date the decision. It ex-
plains how the short-term advantages of racial fortuity interfere 
with long-term progress towards actual racial justice and equal-
ity. Part IV explains how racial fortuity not only disadvantages 
minority interests, but undermines the independent role of the 
judiciary. It also introduces the concept of "forged fortuity" as 
an alternative strategy for promoting meaningful racial progress 
16. See also Bell, 1., Dissenting, supra note 15, at 185-93. 
17. See also Bell, 1., Dissenting, supra note 15, at 196--98. But see Lia B. Epperson, 
True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational Equity in the Wake ofGrutter, 
67 U. PITI. L. REv. 175, 196 (2005) ("[C]ritiques (from Bell] fail to examine some of the 
real challenges that were inherent in advocating for educational opportunities for Afri-
can-American children in an era when our country still sanctioned an apartheid regime in 
the South."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell TolL· The Bell Tolls for 
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1523-33 (2005) (questioning whether Bell's alternative 
scenario would have resulted in voluntary desegregation) (hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, 
For Whom Does the Bell Toll?]. 
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within the existing political framework. Part VI concludes opti-
mistically that a commitment to forged fortuity may ultimately 
reconceptualize society on more equitable and just terms. 
II. RACIAL FORTUITY AND THE QUEST FOR 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN BROWN 
Professor Bell's critique of Brown takes into account the 
role of "racial fortuity" in determining the social, economic and 
political fortunes of Blacks and other racial minorities. He de-
scribes the phenomenon of racial fortuity as a two-part formula. 
First, according to Professor Bell, policymakers throughout his-
tory have willingly sacrificed "basic entitlements of freedom and 
justice" (p. 9) for Blacks in order to resolve economic and politi-
cal differences among competing groups of Whites (pp. 9, 69). 
Second, policymakers will recognize and remedy racial injustices 
only when such action "will benefit the nation's interests without 
significantly diminishing whites' sense of entitlement" (p. 9).18 
The pace of racial progress is thus dictated by repetitive cycles of 
"racial sacrifice" and moments of "interest-convergence." 
Silent Covenants explains Brown's pronouncement against 
segregated schools and the subsequent difficulty in implement-
ing desegregation as a prime example of racial fortuity in a deci-
sion that promoted Black equality to meet a different end. What 
motivated the outcome in Brown and other mid-century civil 
rights gains, says Professor Bell, was a realization that America 
could not proclaim the moral superiority of democratic govern-
ance over Soviet styled communism while tolerating the South's 
apartheid regime (pp. 59-68). The outcome in Brown was never 
about integration or better schools, he says. Brown, at bottom, 
was about the Cold War.19 
A. COLD WAR PRECURSORS TO BROWN 
The Cold War was the Court's "unacknowledged motiva-
tion" in Brown (pp. 60-67). In the years preceding the decision, 
18. See also p. 49; Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AMER. HIST. 
32, 34 (2004), ("[C]ivil rights reform is not a straightforward tale of a struggle for justice, 
but a complex story that includes self-interest and limited commitments."). 
19. The Cold War influence on Brown has been the focus of increased scholarly 
attention in recent years. See, e.g., AZZA SALAMA LAYTON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1960, 115-17 (2000); Kath-
leen A. Bergin, Authenticating American Democracy, 26 PACE L. REV. 397 (2006); Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in International Context 36 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493 (2004). ' 
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communist expansion into Eastern Europe and Asia threatened 
global stability and the interests of United States' allies abroad.20 
Yet Americans, emotionally drained and financially strapped 
from hard-fought battles in Europe and Japan, would not sup-
port military intervention against the Soviet Union.21 President 
Truman thus adopted a strategy of peaceful communist con-
tainment, relying on diplomacy and strategic alliances to nudge 
newly independent ~ost-colonial nations towards a democratic 
form of government. 2 
Key to the "Truman Doctrine" was the United States' abil-
ity to lead by example-to showcase to the world its own com-
mitment to self-governance zrremised on the principles of fair-
ness, justice and equality. Domestic segregation naturally 
tarnished America's international reputation, leading to efforts 
by the state department to convey a positive message about race 
relations abroad (pp. 60-61). Publications of the United States 
Information Agency showcased the "tremendous pace" at which 
democratic societies progressed by juxtaposing the conditions of 
free Blacks at mid-century to the degradation they experienced 
under slavery.24 Broadcasts on Voice of America Radio carried 
the speeches of Black attaches dispatched to foreign nations by 
the State Department to speak of their amicable relationships 
with Whites and the rights available to them in the American 
South (pp. 60-61).25 Alongside its efforts to downplay the impact 
of domestic segregation abroad, the Executive Branch empha-
sized to White Americans how segregation undermined the na-
tion's standing in the world. Professor Bell describes a statement 
made by Chester Bowles, ambassador to India, in a 1952 speech 
at Yale University: 
A year, a month, or even a week in Asia is enough to con-
vince any perceptive American that the colored peoples of 
Asia and Africa, who total two-thirds of the world's popula-
20. See ROGERS. WHITCOMB, THE COLD WAR IN RETROSPECT: THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS 66-75 (1998); JOHN W. YOUNG, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945: 
A GLOBAL HISTORY, 59-{iO (2004). 
21. See DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 282--83 (1977). 
22. See WHITCOMB, supra note 20, at 91-99; YOUNG, supra note 20, at 68-72. 
23. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12, 26-27 (2002) (hereinafter DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL 
RIGHTS). 
24. See id. at 49-54. 
25. See id. at 56-57. 
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tions, seldom think about the United States without consider-
ing the limitation under which our 13 million Negroes are liv-
ing (p. 64). 
277 
The Executive department refused to countenance any 
criticism of America's racial policies at the international level, 
however, taking drastic measures to hide America's harsh treat-
ment towards Blacks (pp. 62-64). Paul Robeson, Josephine 
Baker and Louis Armstrong are just a few of the influential pub-
lic figures who found themselves subject to federal surveillance 
after speaking out against domestic segregation to international 
audiences.26 At a speech in Paris in 1949, Robeson compared the 
racial policies of the United States "to that of Hitler and Goeb-
bels," and warned that Blacks would never take up arms for the 
United States against the Soviet Union.27 The State Department 
concluded that Robeson's "frequent criticism of the treatment of 
blacks in the United States should not be aired in foreign coun-
tries" and considered his travel abroad "contrary to the best in-
terests of the United States."28 The Department rescinded Robe-
son's passport, which it later offered to re-issue only if Robeson 
agreed to keep silent.29 He refused. Baker and Armstrong ex-
perienced equally debilitating government harassment.30 
Anti-communist hysteria prompted the NAACP to distance 
itself from out-spoken Blacks for fear that the organization itself 
would be charged with subversive affiliations (p. 63). It also in-
fluenced the rhetoric of anti-segregation.31 In 1950, the NAACP 
adopted a resolution to "eradicate [communist] infiltration ... 
and expel any unit, which ... comes under Communist or other 
political control and action."32 The NAACP adopted this resolu-
tion, along with a similar one the following year, to assuage sus-
picion it had attracted three years earlier when it petitioned the 
United Nations to investigate racial violence in the South. The 
NAACP's 1947 "Appeal to the World" condemned domestic ra-
26. See id. at 61-77. 
27. See id. at 62. 
28. ld. 
29. MARTIN DOBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON: A BIOGRAPHY 389 (1995). 
30. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 66-77. 
31. Even prior to World War II, the NAACP solicited support from Whites by re-
minding them that their defense of racial equality would undermine Communist criticism 
against the Untied States. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 38 (1987) (hereinafter TUSHNET, 
LEGAL STRATEGY]. 
32. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregalion as a Cold War lmpermive, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 61,76 (1988) (alterations in original) (hereinafter Dudziak, Cold War lmperalive]. 
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cial discrimination as "not only indefensible but barbaric," and 
tagged southern lawmakers, as opposed to the Soviet Union, as 
the real enemy to Blacks.33 The U.S. delegation blocked a Soviet 
proposal to investigate the petition, and Eleanor Roosevelt, then 
a Board member of the NAACP, threatened to resign her posi-
tion as a member of the United Nation's delegation if any nation 
formally considered it (p. 62). A subsequent petition submitted 
in 1951 by William Patterson, chairperson of the Civil Rights 
Congress, accused the United States of committing genocide 
against Blacks "as the result of the consistent, conscious, unified 
policies of every branch of government."34 The United Nations 
again declined to respond, but petitions such as these kept the 
spotlight on an issue that already captured world-wide attention. 
Foreign publications and news bureaus ensured that citizens 
abroad, as well as governments, understood the hypocrisy of 
American racism.35 In 1946, a widely read Soviet publication edi-
torialized that the American South was experiencing a rise in 
"'terroristic acts against negroes,' including 'the bestial mobbing 
of four negroes by a band of 20 to 25 whites,'" and '"a crowd of 
white men [who] tortured a negro war veteran, ... tore his arms 
out and set fire to his body."' It emphasized that '"the murder-
ers, even though they are identified, remain unpunished. "'36 Par-
ticularly damaging to America's global reputation were attacks 
on Black World War II veterans who attempted to exercise the 
democratic freedoms they fought for abroad-the right to equal 
treatment and the right to vote (p. 61 ). International news cov-
erage of America's horrid treatment towards Blacks was so ex-
tensive that in 1949 the American Embassy in Moscow warned 
that '"the 'Negro question' [was o]ne of the principal Soviet 
propaganda themes regarding the United States."'37 
Persistent outrages involving government officials made it 
impossible to discount Southern racism as an episodic or re-
gional anomaly that occurred outside the sanction of law. Profes-
sor Bell describes how Senator Glen Taylor, Henry Wallace's 
33. W.E.B. DuBois, An Appeal to the World (1947), reprinted in W.E.B. DuBOIS 
SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, 1920-1963, at 202, 202-21 (Philip S. Foner ed., 
1970). 
34. See DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 64. 
35. See Dudziak, Cold War Imperative, supra note 32, at 80-93. 
36. See id. at 88 (quoting Dispatch No. 355, from Am. Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R., 
to Dep't of State (Aug. 26, 1946)). 
37. See id. at 89 (quoting Dispatch No. 355, from Am. Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R., 
to Dep't of State (Aug. 26, 1946)) (alteration in original). 
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vice-presidential running mate, was arrested when he tried to 
cross the "colored" entrance to a church in Birmingham, Ala-
bama (p. 62). In other instances, White business owners in 
Washington D.C. refused to service Black diplomats.38 These oc-
currences also caught international attention and strained dip-
lomatic relations. 
President Truman understood the cost of domestic racism to 
his global public relations campaign. He thus invoked executive 
authority to expand the rights of Blacks by desegregating the 
military and prohibiting discrimination in federal employment 
(p. 73). Despite his urging, however, Southern segregationists 
who held key committee positions in Congress blocked broader 
legislative reform.39 Absent congressional support or executive 
authority to act unilaterally, Truman's only alternative avenue of 
reform rested with the judiciary.40 In a series of cases prior to 
Brown, he authorized the Justice Department to intervene as 
amicus and ask the Court to reverse Plessy by holding segrega-
tion unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.41 A 
constitutional pronouncement against segregation would be in-
dispensable to the Cold War effort. It would apply to every re-
gion in the country and provide confirmation, at least symboli-
cally, that a nation founded on democratic principles truly 
recognized no class or caste among its citizens. It is here, Profes-
sor Bell explains, that the Cold War objectives of the Executive 
Branch fortuitously merged with the campaign for racial justice 
being pursued simultaneously by the NAACP (p. 59). 
38. See id. at 9G-91. 
39. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 82-83. 
40. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE 
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 192 (2004) (describing Truman's reliance on 
the judiciary as a means to circumvent legislative obstruction on civil rights issues). 
41. In each of these cases, the Justice Department invoked international considera-
tions against segregation. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
12, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) and 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ("If the imprimatur of constitutionality should be 
put on such a denial of equality, one would expect the foes of democracy to exploit such 
an action for their own purposes."); Brief for the United States at 61, Henderson v. 
United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (identifying criticisms that "typify the manner in 
which racial discrimination in this country is turned against us in the international field"); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948) ("The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an 
adverse effect upon our relations with other countries."). 
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B. COLD WAR CONVERGENCE IN BROWN 
The Justices did not discuss the Cold War implications of 
racial segregation during their judicial conferences on Brown.42 
There is strong evidence, however, that their deliberations were 
at least in part influenced by the impact racial segregation had 
on the nation's security interests. President Truman authorized 
the Department of Justice to submit an amicus brief in Brown to 
emphasize this very point.43 The brief asked the Court to con-
sider the problem of racial discrimination "in the context of the 
present world struggle between freedom and tyranny."44 It ex-
plained that: 
The United States is under constant attack in the foreign 
press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies 
as the United Nations because of various practices of dis-
crimination against minority groups in this country .... [T]he 
undeniable existence of racial discrimination gives unfriendly 
governments the most effective kind of ammunition for their 
propaganda warfare (p. 65).45 
The brief described southern segregation and racial violence as 
"existing flaws" in the American political system that "jeopard-
ize[ d) the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the 
free and democratic nations of the world" (pp. 65-66).46 
International security concerns placed prominently in the 
briefs of other amicus parties as well, including the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation of Teachers, the 
American Jewish Congress, and the American Veterans Com-
mittee.47 These organizations agreed with the position taken by 
the Department of Justice and stated expressly by the NAACP 
in its brief, that "[s]urvival of our country in the present interna-
42. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940--1985): THE PRIVATE 
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 644-69 (Del Dickson 
ed., 2001) (hereinafter CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS). 
43. Briefs and transcripts of the oral arguments in Brown I and Brown II are com-
piled in 49-49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1975) (hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS). 
44. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 [hereinafter DOJ Brief], reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 
116, 121. 
45. DOJ Brief at 7, supra note 44, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, 
at 122. 
46. DOJ Brief at 8, supra note 44, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, 
at 123. 
47. See Bergin, supra note 19, at 407-11. 
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tional situation is inevitably tied to resolution of this domestic 
issue."48 Public school segregation itself had been "the subject of 
much adverse press comment" in those nations the United States 
was "trying to keep in the democratic camp,"49 calling into ques-
tion "how such a practice can exist in a country which professes 
to be a staunch supporter of freedom, justice, and democracy. "50 
Other aspects of the record reinforced the primacy of de-
segregation to the Cold War. At the trial level, Judge Waties 
Waring, dissenting from a decision that upheld segregated 
schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina, noted the "clear 
and important" consequences of racial segregation, "particularly 
at [a] time when our national leaders are called upon to show to 
the world that our democracy means what it says and that it is a 
true democracy and there is no under-cover suppression of the 
rights of any of our citizens because of the pigmentation of their 
skins."51 
In both their personal and professional capacities, the Jus-
tices articulated anxiety about the looming Cold War crisis. In a 
speech to the American Bar Association just one month after 
Brown was decided, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that 
American democracy was on trial "at home and abroad," and 
acknowledged the Court's role in shaping public policy.52 Justice 
Douglas traveled to both India and Pakistan in the early 1950s 
and upon his return wrote about the ideological conflicts present 
in the Cold War and how domestic racism strained the United 
States' relationship with those nations.53 In 1951, Justice Frank-
furter took "judicial notice" of ascending "communist doc-
trines ... in powerful nations who cannot be acquitted of un-
friendliness to the institutions of this country."54 One year later, 
48. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Resp'ts in No. 10 on Reargument 
at 194, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter NAACP Brief], re-
printed in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 514, 707; see also Bergin, supra note 
19, at 409. 
49. Brief on Behalf of Am. Civil Liberties Union et at. as Amici Curiae at 28, 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 [hereinafter ACLU Brief), reprinted in 49 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 156, 183; see also Bergin, supra note 19, at 410. 
50. DOJ Brief at 8, supra note 44, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, 
at 123; see also Bergin, supra note 19, at 410. 
51. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 548 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (Waring, J., dissenting). 
52. See DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CiVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 106. Subsequent to 
Brown, Chief Justice Warren recalled the contradictions between America's "egalitarian 
rhetoric" following World War II and the presence of segregation as a significant influ-
ence on the course of racial progress. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 494-95. 
53. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, BEYOND THE HIGH HIMALAYAS 317, 321-23 
(1953); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE 296 (1951). 
54. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 547 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Justices Reed and Minton acknowledged the "terrifying global 
conflict" arising out of the Cold War, which for them warranted 
judicial deference to Executive priorities.55 These concerns un-
doubtedly influenced the weight given to the Cold War argu-
ments in Brown. 
The Cold War is also responsible, at least in part, for the 
fact that Brown was a unanimous opinion. After hearing oral ar-
guments, Justice Stanley Reed maintained his original defense of 
the "separate but equal" standard announced in Plessy and cast 
a tentative vote favoring the South during an early judicial con-
ference on Brown.56 Justice Reed knew that earlier decisions re-
jecting segregation in law schools, graduate institutions, and pub-
lic train-cars expressly declined to regeal the authority of states 
to segregate other public institutions. He read this precedent as 
direct authority for upholding segregated public schools.58 More-
over, unlike many of his colleagues, Reed was a committed seg-
regationist with absolutely no personal investment in pressing 
the cause of Black equality.59 
At the same time, Reed's initial commitment to segregation 
in Brown clashed with an overwhelming deference to the Execu-
tive Branch, particularly on matters involving international af-
fairs.60 A growing concern over America's position in the Cold 
War and the Soviet Union's military dominance is evident in his 
voting record as well as discussions he had with his law clerk.61 In 
fact, Reed is the only Justice known to have investigated on at 
least two occasions whether other nations permitted racial seg-
regation under their own legal systems.62 Though Reed never ar-
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,668-69 (1952) (Vinson, 
C.J., & Reed, Minton, JJ., dissenting). 
56. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 695-96 (2004) 
(1976). 
57. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S., 339 U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
58. See Bergin, supra note 19, at 420-22. 
59. Though Reed was generally credited with an amiable personality, his position 
on racial issues earned him a reputation among the Court's law clerks for being "thick 
headed," "ruthless," and "anti-black." See JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE 
LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 359 (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter FASSETT, NEW 
DEAL JUSTICE]; see also Bergin, supra note 19, at 411-14 (describing Reed's reaction to 
desegregation decisions and personal interactions with Blacks). 
60. See Bergin, supra note 19, at 432-37. 
61. See id. at 427-29. 
62. See John D. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. the Board of Education, 
THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 1986 YEARBOOK 48 [hereinafter Fassett, Mr. 
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ticulated precisely why he abandoned his dissent,63 Chief Justice 
Warren asked him just prior to his a final vote with the majority 
whether he thought a fractured decision was "really the best 
thing for the country."64 Reed also admitted to his clerk that "the 
attitude of the rest of the world toward segregation is worthy of 
consideration. "65 
Cold War security concerns that reached a peak at mid-
century created a moment of interest-convergence that made 
Brown possible. Prior to 1954, the Court re!;?eatedly rejected re-
quests by the NAACP to over-rule Plessy, 6 adopting instead a 
piecemeal approach that relied on rules of statutory construction 
and dormant commerce clause principles to end segregation 
when it interfered with the economics of trade and transporta-
tion.67 Decisions involving the Equal Protection Clause carefully 
re-affirmed the "separate but equal" doctrine and required de-
segregation only when Black and White facilities could not be 
matched.68 Brown, however, was different. Public school deseg-
regation would shake not only the daily habits and routines of 11 
Justice Reed], available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_1ibrary/subs_ volumes 
/04_c18_k.html. 
63. Justice Reed explained his vote in Brown to Justice Felix Frankfurter by stating 
only that the considerations favoring segregation '"did not add up to a balance against 
the Court's opinion,' and that 'the factors looking toward fair treatment for Negroes are 
more important than the weight of history."' See Bergin, supra note 19, at 426 (quoting 
Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 62, at 63). 
64. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at 702. 
65. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 59, at 571-72; Fassett, Mr. Justice 
Reed, supra note 62, at 54; see also KLUGER, supra note 56, at 696. 
66. See ROBERT J. COTTROL, ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, 
CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 101-13 (2003) (discussing the legal strategy in pre-
Brown desegregation cases); see also TUSHNET, LEGAL STRATEGY, supra note 31, at 
126-32. 
67. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953); 
Henderson v. U.S., 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 217-23 (2004). Professor Bell would character-
ize these decisions as classic examples of interest convergence that provided relief from 
racial injustice only to the extent it benefited Whites. They permitted transitory interac-
tions to the benefit of White commercial interests, but maintained more significant social 
barriers, including public school segregation and bans on inter-racial relationships, that 
preserved the myth of White purity and reality of White privilege. See DERRICK BELL, 
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 7 (1992) ("When 
whites perceive that it will be profitable or at least cost-free to serve, hire, admit, or oth-
erwise deal with blacks on a nondiscriminatory basis, they do so. When they fear-
accurately or not-that there may be a loss, inconvenience, or upset to themselves or 
other whites, discriminatory conduct usually follows.") [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM]. 
68. See e.g, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). On the limits of these cases, see ED CRAY, 
CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 276 (1997). 
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million Southern school children, but the very foundation of 
White separatism and superiority upon which the South ordered 
its society.69 The Court was not willing to disrupt that order until 
Cold War security interests came to the fore. From this perspec-
tive, Brown might register as a loss because it ultimately failed to 
bring about meaningful racial or educational reform. Brown 
failed to bring about meaningful reform because that was never 
its goal. 
C. RACIAL-SACRIFICE FOLLOWING BROWN 
The interests that converged in Brown resulted in a key 
ideological advantage to the United States over the Soviet Un-
ion at the height of the Cold War.70 Brown's immediate impact 
on the racial composition of public schools, however, was negli-
gible. Local, state and federal lawmakers actively subverted 
Brown's constitutional mandate in full view of the Court which 
for the most part remained on the side-lines until nearly a full 
decade had passed.71 Racial fortuity thus came full circle in 
Brown, Professor Bell concludes, as government actors sacri-
ficed the constitutional entitlements and educational rights of 
Black school children in order to maintain pre-Brown levels of 
segregation (pp. 71-72, 94--95). 
69. Southern Whites feared that integrated schools would inevitably lead to inter-
racial friendships and ultimately sexual relationships between Black and White adoles-
cents that would threaten the myth of White racial purity that supported claims to White 
privilege. The symbolic association between integrated schools and inter-racial sex was 
violently captured in 1957 when six Birmingham, Alabama Klansmen castrated a Black 
man after taunting him for "think[ing] nigger kids should go to school with [white] kids." 
See KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 424 (alteration in original). 
70. The United States Information Agency and world-wide news outlets communi-
cated the outcome of Brown to audiences across the globe. See Mary L. Dudziak, The 
Little Rock Crisis, and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance and the Image of American De-
mocracy, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1644-45 (1997); Dudziak, Cold War Imperative, supra 
note 32, at 112-14. 
71. The difficulty in obtaining progress towards desegregation after Brown is well 
documented and analyzed. While some scholars place primary responsibility on the judi-
ciary, others cite the lack of support for the decision from the legislative and executive 
departments. Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of 
American Public Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2003) 
("[C]ourts could have done much more to bring about desegregation, and instead, the 
judiciary has created substantial obstacles to remedying the legacy of racial segregation 
in schools."), with Gerald N. Rosenberg, Tilting at Windmills: Brown II and the Hopeless 
Quest to Resolve Deep-Seated Social Conflict Through Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 31,45 
(2006) ("Because the political support necessary to dismantle the apartheid system was 
lacking in 1955, it would not have mattered what standard the Court adopted."). 
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The seeds of racial sacrifice were planted even prior to the 
announcement of Brown, when a number of Justices voiced con-
cern during the Court's judicial conferences for the impact de-
segregation would have on Whites. No matter how irrational 
"prosegregation emotion," Justice Jackson wrote, "we can 
hardly deny the existence of sincerity and passion of those who 
think that their blood, birth and lineage are something worthy of 
protection by separatism."72 Justice Reed was even more solici-
tous, urging the Court to "start with the idea that there is a large 
and reasonable body of opinion in various states that separation 
of the races is for the benefit of both. "73 The record suggests that 
several Justices agreed to strike down segregation on the condi-
tion that Chief Justice Warren draft an opinion that did not re-
quire immediate implementation from the South.74 
As such, the Court ruled segregated schools unconstitu-
tional in 1954 but waited a full year before announcing a reme-
dial decree that established the "all deliberate speed" standard 
of compliance.75 The decree instructed local school boards to 
make a "prompt and reasonable start" towards full desegrega-
tion,76 but district courts charged with monitoring compliance 
were never told when desegregation should begin, when it 
should end, or what pace of progress to demand in between." 
They were instead instructed to move cautiously and authorized 
to interrupt a desegregation glan once it began if circumstances 
warranted "additional time." 8 The Justices hoped this coolin~ 
off period would induce voluntary compliance from the South, 
but only prolonged delay by relinquishing oversight to "the most 
recalcitrant judge and the most defiant school board. "80 
72. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at 693. 
73. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 42, at 649. 
74. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at 698. 
75. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955). 
76. !d. at 300. 
77. See id. 
78. !d. 
79. See James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 
24LAW & INEQ. 47, 49-52 (2006) (citing institutional limitations amid predictable oppo-
SitiOn from the South among reasons why the Court adopted the "all deliberate speed" 
standard). 
80. See J. W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL 
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 55 (1971); see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL 
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 11 (1st ed. 2004) ("Even though the Court's ruling was unani-
mous, Its reluctance to take a more forceful position on ending segregation immediately 
played mto the hands of the integration opponents."). 
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Immediately after Brown, the Court let stand a series of dis-
trict court judgments that distinguished between "integration" 
and "desegregation" by recognizing a right of White school chil-
dren to avoid compulsory integration with Blacks. Brown, the 
lower courts agreed, "does not require integration. It merely 
forbids discrimination. "81 In did not prevent Whites from keep-
ing themselves apart from Blacks, but only prohibited the gov-
ernment from requiring them to do so. One district judge in 
Texas reasoned that if Black children experienced a psychologi-
cal injury "by not being allowed to sit in white classes in the 
school room," as was presumed in Brown, then White children 
necessarily suffered an "inferiority complex" when "required to 
sit in classes with the colored child."82 The distinction between 
"desegregation" and "integration" established in these cases led 
to the proliferation of "freedom of choice" plans, transfer provi-
sions and other measures that maintained actual segregation 
while purporting to comply with Brown.83 
Judicial inertia on the part of the Supreme Court embold-
ened White resistance even to nominal desegregation. In 1958, 
Arkansas governor Orval Faubus dispatched national guard 
troops to obstruct a district order that permitted nine Black 
school children to enroll in Little Rock's Central High School (p. 
95). A cadre of angry whites stood in for the troops when they 
were called off, resulting in a melee that required the dispatch of 
federal guards. The event came to symbolize the South's stead-
fast opposition to Brown, until it was overshadowed by fire-hose 
and canine attacks on peaceful civil rights demonstrators and the 
murder of four young Black girls in the bombing of a Birming-
ham, Alabama Baptist Church.84 In response to Faubus, the 
Court affirmed the formal constitutional obligation of states to 
comply with federallaw,85 but declined to scrutinize the overall 
lack of progress in the South. Enforcement of Brown was so lax 
that by 1964 just over one percent of Black students in the 11 
81. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776,777 (E. D. S.C. 1955). 
82. Borders v. Rippy, 188 F. Supp. 231,232 (E.D. Tex. 1960) (emphasis added). 
83. See, e.g., Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959); Kelly v. Board of 
Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 228-29 (6th Cir. 1959); Jackson v. School Bd., 203 F. Supp. 701, 706 
(W.D. Va. 1962). Some courts went so far as to uphold outright segregation even after 
Brown based on the supposed psychological instability and intellectual deficiencies of 
Black school children. See Stell v. Savannah Chatham-County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 
667, 683 (S.D. Ga. 1963). 
84. See KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 430--41. 
85. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958). 
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states of the old confederacy attended school with Whites (p. 
96). 
Racial fanaticism in response to Brown ultimately provided 
the catalyst for federal legislative intervention. Regional unrest 
brought a halt to tourism in the South, causing business owners 
to demand a federal response.86 So did moderate Whites in the 
North who, safe on the side-lines up to that point, saw the brutal 
backlash to Brown as a repulsive and dangerous threat to the na-
tion's domestic security. (p. 7).87 Pressured into action, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to outlaw racial discrimina-
tion in employment, housing and public accommodations.88 Title 
VI specifically outlawed segre~ation in federally funded institu-
tions including public schools. In 1965, Congress promised bil-
lions in federal school aid under the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act,90 while executive guidelines conditioned funding 
on proof that local schools in fact improved the racial composi-
tion of their student bodies (pp. 96-97).91 
Federal efforts to buy compliance with Brown provided the 
Court with leverage to wield against resistant school districts 
(pp. 107-09). In 1968, it abandoned the "all deliberate speed" 
standard by demanding that school boards "come forward with a 
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realisti-
cally to work now."92 It extended district court supervision to 
student transportation, teacher hiring, facilities construction and 
other aspects of school operations.93 Three years later it author-
ized district courts to establish racial balancing targets, alter at-
tendance zones, and initiate bussing.94 Segregation was so en-
trenched in some jurisdictions that "administratively awkward, 
inconvenient, and even bizarre" remedies might be necessary to 
eliminate a "dual" school system, the Court said.95 Thus coopera-
tion between the legislative, executive and judicial departments 
86. See Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 40. 
87. See also KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 441-42. 
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). 
89. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1964). 
90. See 20 U.S. C.§§ 6301 (1965). 
91. See also Jeffrey A. Raffel, History of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 25-26 (Rossell et al. eds, 2002); Bradley W. 
Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169,223 (1999) (reviewing 
GARY 0RFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA T/ON (1996). 
92. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
93. See id. at 435. 
94. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-30 (1971). 
95. See id. at 28. 
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increased the percentage of Black students attending White 
schools exponentially. By 1988, the South had become the most 
integrated region in the country.96 
These gains were ultimately short lived, however. Bussing 
measures and district consolidation schemes used to desegregate 
urban schools pushed White families further into the suburbs 
where discriminatory lending and real estate practices kept the 
neighborhoods, and by default the neighborhood schools, com-
fortably White (pp. 109-11). Though White flight was, and con-
tinues to be, a primary cause of segregation between urban and 
suburban school districts in large metropolitan regions,97 inter-
district desegregation remedies are permitted only if Black and 
White students were forced by law to enroll in different districts, 
or the racially discriminatory acts of one district formally caused 
segregation in another.98 This rationale reflects the "states 
rights" philosophy of those Justices appointed to the bench after 
Brown, and has been criticized for drawing an artificial distinc-
tion between "de jure," or forced racial segregation on the one 
hand, and "de facto" or supposedly voluntary racial separation 
on the other.99 Indeed, apart from race-based school assign-
ments, the decision to locate a school deep within a racially iden-
tifiable neighborhood all but guarantees continued educational 
• 100 
segregatiOn. 
During this same period, the Court, despite the national im-
portance of education cited in Brown, declined to recognize it as 
a "fundamental right," which would have required states to rem-
96. See Michal R. Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown v. Board of Education: 
The Genesis of the Warren Court's Quest for Equality, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 863, 873 
(2004). 
97. In 1992, for instance, the Court alluded to the consequences of White flight by 
noting that "racially stable neighborhoods are not likely to emerge because whites prefer 
a racial mix of 80% white and 20% black, while blacks prefer a 50-50 mix." Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992). Even within school districts, "young middle-class white 
families have successfully been pressuring their school boards to carve out almost en-
tirely separate provinces of education for their children." JONATHAN KozoL, THE 
SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 
135 (1st ed. 2005); see also Alfred A. Lindseth, Legal Issues Related to School Fund-
ing/Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 91, 
at 41, 46. 
98. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744-45 (1974). 
99. See id. at 761-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
100. Jd. at 761 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 785 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
("Exacerbating the effects of extensive residential segregation between Negroes and 
whites, the school board consciously drew attendance zones along lines which maximized 
!he segregation of the races in schools as well."). 
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edy funding disparities between urban and suburban school dis-
tricts.101 Additional setbacks continued into the 1990s (pp. 126-
29),102 beginning with the Court's 1991 decision that the Okla-
homa City School District might be released from its obligations 
under a court ordered desegregation plan, before actually inte-
gratinJ a number of heavily segregated schools within the dis-
trict.1 Judicial decrees "are not intended to operate in perpetu-
ity,"104 the Court explained, which meant that a school district 
earned release from judicial oversight once "good faith" compli-
ance with a court order eliminated segregation "to the extent 
practicable. "105 School districts are no longer required to elimi-
nate segregation in fact. 
The following year, the Court authorized district courts to 
suspend a desegregation decree in incremental stages before a 
school district demonstrated full compliance in all other areas of 
school operations.106 Together, these concessions all but preclude 
relief for existing segregation or that which promises to reappear 
once an order is lifted. When that occurs, plaintiffs can no longer 
petition a district court for a rehearing, but must initiate an en-
tirely new lawsuit and meet the nearly impossible burden of pro-
ducing contemporary evidence of racial intent in order to renew 
judicial oversight (p. 126).107 Moreover, these decisions acknowl-
edged the connection between educational segregation and seg-
regated housing patterns but declined to compel a remedy for 
this mutually reinforcing phenomenon.108 
101. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
102. The Court's most recent desegregation decisions have been criticized for ena-
bling school districts to return to a state of effective racial segregation. See, e.g., KEVIN 
BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR 
PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 205-22 (2005); PETER 
IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 259-
88 (2004); Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 1615-19; Bryan K. Fair, The Anatomy of 
American Caste, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 381, 403-05 (1999). 
103. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,242-44 (1991). 
104. !d. at 248. 
105. !d. at 249-50. 
106. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,489 (1992). 
107. See also Fair, supra note 102, at 404. 
108. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494 ("Once the racial imbalance due to the de 
jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbal-
ance that is caused by demographic factors.") (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971)). This rationale continued to create dissention 
among the Justices. See id. at 514 (Biackmun, J., concurring) (noting how the "placement 
of new schools and closure of old schools and programs such as magnet classrooms and 
majority-to-minority ... transfer policies affect the racial composition of the schools."); 
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The [student reassignment plan] su-
penmposed attendance zones over some residentially segregated areas. As a result, con-
siderable racial imbalance reemerged in 33 of 64 elementary schools in the Oklahoma 
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Finally, in 1995, the Court ruled that a district court could 
not force school officials in an urban district to implement edu-
cational improvements for the ;urpose of attracting Whites stu-
dents from suburban districts. 1 Years of unconstitutional segre-
gation produced stark racial disparities in school enrollment and 
student performance within Kansas City, Missouri. Because the 
district itself was predominately Black, however, a judicial order 
that reshuffled students to different schools within the district 
would have only reproduced those disparities. 110 The district 
court thus ordered law makers to initiate salary increases, capital 
improvements, and curriculum enrichments to improve the edu-
cational quality of Kansas City schools with the hopes of encour-
aging voluntary enrollment from Whites in suburban districts.lll 
Not a single White student from surrounding suburban districts 
was forced to do so under the court's order. Still, the Supreme 
Court rejected that approach, holding that the very purpose of 
encouraging enrollment from Whites in suburban districts quali-
fied as an "interdistrict goal" that exceeded the scope of Kansas 
City's "intradistrict violation." 112 
The history of desegregation litigation presaged the unfor-
tunate reality of continuing school segregation today. A report 
by the Harvard Civil Rights Project summarizing data from 2001 
concluded that public schools were more raciallf segregated in 
2001 than at any time in the previous 30 years.11 A later report 
found that, for minority students, effective schools are as rare as 
integrated ones, with "devastating poverty, limited resources, 
and various social and health problems" concentrated in over-
City system with student bodies either greater than 90% Afro· American or greater than 
90% non-Afro-American."). 
109. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
110. !d. at 76. 
111. !d. at 76-78. 
112. !d. at 92. 
113. See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with 
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? 6 (The Gvil Rights Project, Jan. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edulresearch!reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDrearn. 
pdf. See also Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's 
Nightmare 4 (The Civil Rights Project, Jan. 2004), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/researchlreseg04/brown50.pdf ("For more than 
a decade, we have been headed backward toward greater segregation for black students. 
For Latinos, who have recently become the largest group of minority students, segrega-
tion has been steadily increasing ever since the first national data were collected in the 
late 1960s."). "[A]s of the 2000-2001 school year, white students, on average, a~tended 
schools where 80 percent of the student body was white. Minority students were mcreas-
ingly attending schools that were virtually nonwhite" (p. 127). 
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whelmingly non-White schools (p. 127). 114 In the few schools that 
are racially diverse, suspiciously vague tracking criteria and abil-
ity grouping reproduce Ratterns of racial isolation within the 
classroom (pp. 112-13). 5 For Professor Bell, racial sacrifice 
played a role in bringing about the unfortunate circumstances 
that render America's public schools both separate and unequal, 
and consequently unable to demonstrate compliance with Plessy 
much less Brown. 
III. SITUATING BROWN WITHIN A HISTORY OF 
RACIAL FORTUITY 
Silent Covenants places Brown on a continuum of events 
that demonstrate the role of racial fortuity in governmental deci-
sion-making (pp. 29-48). This Part examines three events in par-
ticular: the abolition of slavery in the North, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and the approval of diversity-based admissions 
programs. 116 The motivations for these events and the set-backs 
that followed them support Professor Bell's conclusion that the 
"perceived self-interest by whites rather than the racial injustices 
suffered by blacks has been the major motivation in racial-
remediation policies" (p. 59). 
114. See also Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and 
Educational Inequality 16 (The Civil Rights Project, Jan. 2005), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Why_Segreg_Matters.pdf ("The 
reality of segregation by race and poverty means that, while the majority of white stu-
dents attend middle class schools, minority students in racially segregated schools are 
very likely attending a school of concentrated poverty."). 
115. See also Mildred Wingfall Robinson, Brown: Why We Must Remember, 89 
MARQ. L. REV. 53, 54 (2005) ("General tracking, a practice that theoretically allows a 
match between student ability and level of instruction, still all too often separates chil-
dren by color[, as do) programs for the gifted, for those with learning challenges, and for 
those for whom English is a second language."). 
116. Professor Bell distinguishes between incidents that reflect "racial sacrifice" and 
those that concern "interest-convergence," though the combined influence of "racial for-
tuity" generally is visible in each episode he describes. In addition to the three incidents 
discussed in this Essay, Professor Bell examines the cyclical patterns of reform and re-
treat in the Constitution's slavery compromise, universal White male suffrage, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), the 
Hayes-Tilden Compromise, the Southern Disenfranchisement Compromise, the death 
penalty, criminal sentencing disparities, unemployment measures and housing patterns 
(pp. 29-48). See also Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegrega-
tion Fails as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black 
Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 757, 780 (2005) (citing principles of 
racial fortuity to explain why systemic police brutality against people of color goes unre-
mcdied). 
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A. RACIAL FORTUITY INN ORTHERN EMANCIPATION 
Alexis De Tocqueville observed in 1835 that "[s]lavery in 
the United States [was] destroyed in the interest, not of the Ne-
groes, but of the whites. "117 This early application of racial fortu-
ity was evident in the North as well as the South. Prior to the 
Revolutionary War, slavery took root in New Jersey, New York 
and Massachusetts as a means of labor production to support the 
emerging colonies.118 Other colonies also experimented with 
slavery, but regional industrialization and an expanding surplus 
of White laborers prevented the institution from becoming the 
economic necessity it was in the agrarian South.119 The struggle 
against British tyranny also made it difficult for those Whites 
who did own slaves to rationalize a claim to ownership in human 
flesh, 120 a point emphasized in abolitionist literature and 
speeches. 121 Moreover, White workers campaigned against slav-
ery on the ground that it interfered with their own opportunities 
for paid labor, while politicians complained that it reduced the 
colonies' prestige among European nations. 122 These were the 
primary economic and political conditions that induced abolition 
in the North prior to the Civil War. 
Lawmakers nonetheless delayed freedom for Blacks out of 
concern for the financial interests of Whites. Professor Bell cites 
a 1780 Pennsylvania statute that made every child born to a slave 
an "indentured servant" to their parent's master until the age of 
28 (p. 51).123 Other states required slaves to complete a term of 
indentured servitude to compensate owners for their "fair mar-
ket value" (p. 51). New York established a voluntary emancipa-
tion scheme, offering slave-owners 500 acres of land in exchange 
for a slave they surrendered to the Revolutionary Army.124 Free-
117. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 403 (Gerald E. Bevan 
trans., 2003). 
118. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE 
STATES, 1790-1860, at3--4 (1961). 
119. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 98 (1978). 
120. See LITWACK, supra note 118, at 8. 
121. See BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 43-50 
(1961). 
122. See LITWACK, supra note 118, at 5-9. 
123. See also Paul Finkelman, The Dragon St. George Could Not Slay: Tucker's Plan 
to End Slavery, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1231 (2006) (comparing rationale for 
gradual emancipation statutes in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Connecticut with racial 
ideology that precluded emancipation in Virginia). 
124. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 119, at 138. 
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dom in the North was hardly free. Nor did it guarantee Blacks 
equality with Whites. Most colonies restricted the property, vot-
ing, and marriage rights of free Blacks during and after abolition 
to confirm their subordinate status to Whites.125 
B. RACIAL FORTUITY IN LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION 
Professor Bell also evaluates the Emancipation Proclama-
tion in terms of racial fortuity (pp. 52-57). Despite a strong per-
sonal conviction against slavery, as President, Abraham Lincoln 
declined to interfere with the institution for fear of provoking 
further rebellion in the South (p. 53). Lincoln did not view 
emancipation as a moral imperative, but '"a practical war meas-
ure to be decided upon according to the advantages or disadvan-
tages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion. "'126 In his 
famous response to abolitionist Horace Greely, Lincoln de-
fended his ambivalence: 
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and 
is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the 
Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also 
do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do 
because I believe it helps to save the Union. I shall do less 
whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause, 
and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will 
help the cause (p. 53). 
Military necessity ultimately prompted Lincoln to draft the 
Emancipation Proclamation in 1862. The war "had gone from 
bad to worse," he later explained, "we had about played our last 
card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game!"127 He wa-
gered on "fre~dom to the slaves in the South for the purpose of 
hastening the end of the war. "128 It paid off. The measure pro-
vided a steady stream of Black reinforcements for Union troops 
and destabilized the southern agrarian economy by draining it of 
slave labor (pp. 54-55). It also gave foreign abolitionist govern-
ments a reason to withhold political and financial support from 
the Confederacy (p. 54).129 These political objectives tipped the 
125. See id. at 139, 148, 286; LITWACK, supra note 118, at 64-152. 
126. P. 54 (quoting Irving Dilliard, The Emancipation Proclamation in the Perspec-
tive of Time, 23 LAW IN TRANSITION 95,98 (1963)). 
127. See JOHN HOPE fRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 31 (1995). 
128. See id. at 32. 
129. See also PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN 
294 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:271 
scales in favor of emancipation long before it could have been 
sold on the premise of human dignity alone. 
C. RACIAL FORTUITY IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The benefits of diversity based affirmative action programs 
are also fortuitous, says Professor Bell (pp. 138-59). Gruffer v. 
Bollinger upheld the admissions program at the University of 
Michigan Law School, which considered an applicant's race 
along with other variables in order to promote diversity among 
the entering class.130 More than 300 organizations signed amicus 
briefs in support of the law school, including academics, labor 
unions, Fortune 500 companies, and retired military and civilian 
defense officials, arguing that racial diversity constituted a 
"compelling" government interest (p. 148).131 A majority of the 
Court adopted their position that diversity promotes "cross-
racial understanding," advances "learning outcomes," and pre-
pares students for an "increasingly diverse workforce and soci-
ety."132 It also agreed with the opinion of high ranking officers 
and civilian military leaders that a "'highly qualified, racially di-
verse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill 
its principle mission to provide national security."'133 Diversity-
based education programs also open "the path to leadership," it 
said, which ultimately produced "a set of leaders with legitimacy 
in the eyes of the citizenry. "134 
This rationale is influenced by the role of racial fortuity. 
The Court had previously characterized race-based remedies as 
a "highly suspect tool" even when used to counter the effects of 
documented discrimination,135 and rejected the use of race-
friendly hiring incentives as a remedy for nation-wide discrimi-
nation against minority-owned small businesses.136 Gruffer made 
147 (1994). But see ALLEN C. GUELZO, LiNCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: 
THE END OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 9 (2004) (arguing that Emancipation entailed politi-
cal disadvantages that Lincoln understood). 
130. 539 u.s. 306,337-39 (2003). 
131. /d. at 330--31. 
132. /d. at 330. 
133. /d. at 331 (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae at 5). 
134. /d. at 332. 
135. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (citing City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)). 
136. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (1989) (holding that the national trend of discrimi-
nation in the construction industry as identified by Congress did not justify hiring incen-
tives offered by City of Richmond to promote municipal contracting opportunities for 
minority businesses). 
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no attempt to identify, much less purge, the systemic influence of 
such discrimination, says Bell. Instead, it was "[ d]iversity in the 
classroom, the work floor, and the military, not the need to ad-
dress past and continuing racial barriers" that gained the Court's 
approval (p. 151). 
The plan in Grutter not only favored the interests of corpo-
rate entities and government elites, it also mitigated any adverse 
impact on White applicants-a particular concern for Justice 
O'Connor, who cast the deciding vote and authored the majority 
opinion.137 The admissions committee undertook a "highly indi-
vidualized, holistic review of each applicant's file" to determine 
whether non-traditional Whites, in addition to racial minorities, 
might enhance the broad-based diversity of the entering class.m 
O'Connor thought it significant that the law school routinely 
admitted White candidates with grades and test scores lower 
than Black, Hispanic and other minority candidates that were re-
jected.139 This set the Law School apart from the University of 
Michigan's undergraduate institution which allocated a fixed 
number of diversity "bonuses" to every underrepresented mi-
nority applicant. 140 O'Connor's vote in Gratz v. Bollinger sealed 
the fate of that program too, which impermissibly made '"the 
factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified 
underrepresented minority applicant. "141 The whims of racial for-
tuity thus dictate the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams according to their ephemeral value to Whites (p. 159). 
IV. RECKONING WITH RACIAL FORTUITY 
Silent Covenant compels racial justice advocates to consider 
the costs of fortuitous progress before conceding its benefits. 
First, as described by Professor Bell, racial fortuity requires that 
people of color submit to serious and long-term injustices until 
intervening factors compel change (pp. 69-72). Second, fortui-
tous relief is temporary and subject to shifting policy priorities 
because it ignores the underlying ideological root of racial preju-
137. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, 1., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning that race-based remedies for statutory 
discrimination violation must "not impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or un-
necessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by 
a plan's racial preferences"). 
138. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
139. !d. at 338. 
140. /d. at 337 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)). 
141. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (alteration in original). 
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dice that breeds continuing inequality (pp. 71-72). Moreover, 
fortuitous progress does not address how lawmakers leverage ra-
cial tension in support of policies that undermine the economic 
interests of poor and working-class Whites, and therefore per-
petuate resentment and hostility from those groups towards any 
measure of reform (p. 79). 
These drawbacks to racial fortuity are visible in the three 
episodes described in Part III. Specifically, Black Africans en-
dured up to a century of enslavement in the North and more 
than two centuries in the South before utilitarian motive led to 
emancipation. Lincoln himself spoke eloquently against slavery's 
brutality142 but reversed regional emancipation orders issued by 
Union field commanders in occupied areas of the South (p. 53). 
He supported gradual abolition, compensation for Whites, and 
deportment of African descendants more than 200 years after 
they and their families had been dismantled and dispersed across 
the American continent.143 Pragmatic motives also led the Court 
in Grutter to affirm the social, economic, and strategic benefits of 
integrated schools-the same benefits attributed to desegrega-
tion in Brown 144 -after previously rejecting race-friendly pro-
grams that acknowledged and sought to remedy documented 
discrimination against people of color.145 
Fortuitous racial progress under these conditions legitimizes 
more formidable barriers to opportunity and obscures the role of 
racial animus or indifference in maintaining those barriers. 
Brown itself promoted equality by pronouncement, Professor 
Bell states, when it defined "separate" to be "unequal" without 
once mentionin~ the pernicious ideological foundation of segre-
gation (p. 196).1 White lawmakers could simply repeal segrega-
142. See, e.g., GUELZO, supra note 129, at 4 ("I hate (slavery] because of the mon-
strous injustice of slavery itself(,] ... because it deprives our republican example of its 
just influence in the world-enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to 
taunt us as hypocrites .... "); 8 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1953, 361 (1953) ("Whenever (I] hear any one, arguing for slavery I 
feel a strong impulse to see it tried on him personally.") (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted); Dilliard, supra note 126, at 96 ("If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can 
not remember when I did not so think and feel." (quoting Letter from Lincoln to A.G. 
Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 10 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN 65 (Gettysburg 
ed. 1905))). 
143. See PALUDAN, supra note 129, at 130-31. 
144. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954). 
145. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989). 
146. See also Juan F. Perea, Buscanda America: Why Integration and Equal Protec-
tion Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1426 (2004) ("Brown and its subse-
quent enforcement as integration, without repudiation of the White racism that caused 
2006] BOOK REVIEWS 297 
tion statutes, proclaim the neutrality of government rules, and 
spin the continuance of economic and political subordination of 
people of color after Brown into proof of racial inferiority.147 The 
decision thus legitimized continuing racial oppression in public 
schools and other institutions that, for the most part, remained 
separate, unequal, and racially toxic long after Brown. 
Similarly, emancipation provided much needed relief from 
the evils of chattel bondage, but it came after two and a half cen-
turies of slavery and did nothing to exorcise the myth of Black 
inferiority that gave birth to Jim Crow.148 So, too, Grutter is 
viewed by many as an affirmative action victory despite the near 
universal reliance on standardized test scores, legacy prefer-
ences, and other arbitrary criteria that disadvantage minority 
applicants to a far greater degree than they could ever hope to 
benefit under race-based affirmative action.149 Legal precedent 
makes it impossible to challenge these deceptive~ neutral ad-
mission criteria without proof of racial "intent. "1 This is true 
even in the case of standardized tests that statistically fail to pre-
dict an applicant's educational competence or likelihood of pro-
fessional success.151 Even Justice Thomas, whose dissent in Grut-
ter decried the use of "unseemly" admission standards that 
segregation, dealt only with the symptom, and not the cause, of racial inequality."). 
147. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717 
(1992). 
148. See CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON, DANGEROUS LIASONS: SEX AND LOVE IN 
THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 50 (2003) (noting how segregation statutes "symbolized the 
intention of whites to maintain a racial separateness that supported the notion of white 
supremacy"); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 11 (3d rev. 
ed. 1974) (identifying "Anglo-Saxon superiority and innate African inferiority" as "ideo-
logical roots" of segregation). 
149. See D. Marvin Jones, When "Victory" Masks Retreat: The LSAT, Constitutional 
Dualism, and the End of Diversity, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 15, 20 (2006) (providing statis-
tics to demonstrate that "over-reliance upon the LSAT is the proximate cause of the sys-
temic decline in minority enrollment" in accredited law schools); John D. Lamb, The 
Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and Yale, 26 COLUM J.L. 
& Soc. PROBS. 491, 504 (1993) (showing that more Whites have gained admission to 
Harvard in previous years pursuant to preferences granted to the children of alumni than 
the total number of Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students combined). 
150. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (requiring proof of "in-
vidious discriminatory purpose" before subjecting facially-neutral criteria to constitu· 
tiona! scrutiny). 
151. Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 
623 (1999) ("Standardized tests measure two things: the ability to take other standard-
ized tests and economic class. We all recognize that they do not tell us whether a person 
would be a good lawyer."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to Dis-
mantle His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 134-35 (2005) (discussing empirical studies that discount the value 
of the LSAT). 
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arbitrarily privilege White applicants, refused to subject race-
neutral admissions criteria to constitutional scrutiny. 152 
Finally, until poor and working-class Whites come to under-
stand how lawmakers leverage racial tension to justify indis-
criminate economic subordination, they will continue to oppose 
even temporary and symbolic racial progress despite the many 
social or political benefits they themselves derive on account of 
fortuitous reform. Racism, Professor Bell explains, "has been a 
powerful force fracturing the 'lower classes' and inducing large 
numbers of them to think, vote, and act in defiance of what 
might be expected to be their rational economic self-interest" (p. 
79). It provides poor and working-class Whites "a consoling 
sense of superiority and status" over Blacks, Hispanics and other 
people of color with whom they share economic vulnerability, 
and in turn leads them to resist racial equality even in symbolic 
or temporary form. 153 
The Emancipation Proclamation, for example, hastened the 
end of the Civil War, but its terms applied only to areas "in re-
bellion against the United States" and therefore beyond the 
reach of federal law (pp. 54-55).154 The document itself was le-
gally unenforceable in the confederacy; yet Lincoln's strategic 
endorsement of freedom for Blacks cost his party significant 
support among voters (p. 55). News of Lincoln's order prompted 
riots against the Union draft and an untold number of beatings, 
burnings and lynchings against Blacks whom Whites blamed for 
the physical costs and economic hardships of war (pp. 55-56). 
Emancipation may have saved the Union, but it enraged millions 
of poor and working-class Whites in both the North and the 
South who calculated freedom for Blacks in zero-sum terms. 
152. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The 
Equal Protection Clause docs not, however, prohibit the use of unseemly legacy prefer-
ences or many other kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures. What the Equal Protec-
tion Clause docs prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race."). Justice Thomas 
predicted that elite educational institutions would abandon legacy preferences and other 
arbitrary admissions criteria if the Court invalidated the use of race-friendly standards. 
/d. at 368 n.lO. 
153. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiceness as Properly, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1741-43 
(1993) (identifying historically how racial status and privilege "could ameliorate and as-
sist in 'evad(ing] rather than confront(ing] (class] exploitation"' (quoting DAVID 
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 13 (1991))) (alteration in original). 
154. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 73--74 (1996). Legally recognized 
freedom for Blacks did not occur until 1865, after the Confederacy surrendered and the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified. See U.S. CONST. amend XIII. 
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Similarly, opposition to desegregation led significant num-
bers of southern Whites to dismiss the Cold War advantages of 
Brown and demand through protest and violence that federal, 
state and local law makers undertake to preserve segregated 
schools.155 Today, many Whites focus their energy on defeating 
diversity-based admission programs when they are far more 
likely to be rejected from a top institution in favor of a less quali-
fied athlete, legacy admit, or child of a wealthy donor than a 
beneficiary of affirmative action.156 The dearth of minority stu-
dents enrolled in elite institutions in itself belies any argument 
that diversity programs displace Whites to any meaningful de-
gree.157 Even race-neutral reforms are presumed to confer unde-
served benefits to people of color at the expense of Whites. A 
plan in Texas to automatically admit to the state's colleges and 
universities every student who graduates at the top ten percent 
of their high school class has come under fire by a growing num-
ber of Whites who claim that the program unjustly rewards mi-
norities in less rigorous high schools (pp. 145-46). This position 
overlooks how the program benefits poor and working-class 
Whites, and especially Whites in rural areas, who would not have 
been admitted to the state's most elite institutions on merit 
alone. 158 Moreover, financially disadvantaged students of any 
race will still encounter economic barriers to higher education 
even if they earn automatic admission to the state's colleges and 
universities (p. 146). 
155. See KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 421-24 (discussing beatings, riots and bomb-
ings committed by angry Whites committed to forestalling desegregation in the South 
following Brown). 
156. The plaintiff in Grutter for example was rejected for admission despite numeri-
cal test scores and grade point averages that exceeded those of other White students who 
were admitted. See 539 U.S. at 338. 
157. The complexity of factors that influence admission mean that the probability for 
admission of a White applicant would rise 1.5% if affirmative action were eliminated at 
the most elite institutions. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE 
RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND 
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 36 (1998). An end to diversity-based hiring programs in legal 
academia would likely have as marginal an impact on White employment opportunities 
given the low number of professors of color (p. 144). 
158. See Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll?, supra note 17, at 1537-38 
(noting that the University of Texas at Austin had never enrolled a student from several 
rural White areas prior to the Ten Percent Plan). Perceived unfairness also drives White 
opposition to employer-based affirmative action programs, notwithstanding their sub-
stantial benefit to Whites. Corporate hiring campaigns to diversify the applicant pool, 
without a corresponding hiring commitment, do little to counter discriminatory employ-
ment practices that disadvantage people of color, but they do increase the total number 
of White applicants who can compete for opportunities that would have otherwise gone 
to favored insiders (p. 141). 
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V. FORGING FORTUITY WITHIN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Silent Covenants is primarily a lesson about the practical 
limits of racial fortuity. It nonetheless raises a theoretical ques-
tion not directly addressed in the text, but relevant still to a 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between racial 
fortuity, representative democracy, and judicial authority. Racial 
fortuity not only undermines the utility of judicial advocacy as a 
mechanism of racial reform, as Professor Bell recognizes, but 
conflates political and judicial decision-making in a way that im-
pugns the role of courts, especially the Supreme Court, in the 
constitutional order. 
An independent judiciary is meant to enforce constitutional 
boundaries against breaches by the political branches-even 
those sanctioned by the supposed will of the majority.159 This in-
cludes the expedient use of race as a bargaining chip to settle 
disputes among competing factions of Whites.160 Those strategies 
can be said to result from defects in the political process, includ-
ing formal and informal barriers to voting and other means of 
democratic participation, which limit the political influence of 
Blacks and other people of color.161 Under these circumstances, 
policy priorities reflect not the reasoned will of the voting major-
ity after accounting for minority concerns, but the self-interest of 
selectively engaged constituents articulated as a commitment to 
the racial status-quo.162 The resulting legislation is precisely what 
159. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 570 (1998) (discussing historical understanding of tyranny as "the 
abuse of power by government-even by representative government acting on the basis 
of what a majority of its constituents wanted."). 
160. The Equal Protection Clause, for instance, carries a structural as well as sub-
stantive dimension to the extent it is interpreted to justify heightened judicial review of 
political policies that target a "suspect class" on account of biases likely to infect the law-
making process. This proposition derives from the famous "Footnote 4" in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). 
161. See LAN! GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 7-9 (1994) (noting how political majorities 
have controlled the influence of racial minorities by denying them the right to vote, alter-
ing the size and structure of voting districts, and re-allocating decision-making authority 
among collective lawmaking bodies once minorities assume public office). 
162. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 153 (1980) ("'Race prejudice divides groups that have much in common (black 
and poor whites) and unites groups (white, rich and poor) that have little else in common 
than their antagonism for the racial minority. [It] provides the 'majority of the whole' 
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courts are expected to scrutinize through the process of judicial 
review in order to moderate the tendency towards legislative 
abuse. 163 Federal judges, unlike lawmakers, operate above the 
pressures of political passion, free from the coercive influence of 
public accountability. This political insularity provides courts 
with the capacity to defer to established principle in a way that 
legislatures and the executive cannot.164 The forces of fortuity, 
however, cede the principles of constitutional decisionmaking to 
the racial priorities of government, corporate or military inter-
ests, thereby impugning the central function of an independent 
judiciary. Civil rights advocates might find comfort in the imme-
diate outcome of cases like Brown and Grutter, but a judiciary 
that elevates politics over principle will be quick to reverse those 
gains in future case if policy priorities so dictate. 
There is, however, an optimistic alternative for generating 
reform within the existing constitutional framework. In the af-
termath of Brown, Bell counsels civil rights advocates to rely less 
on the judiciary "and more on tactics, actions, and even attitudes 
that challenge the continuing assumptions of white dominance" 
(p. 9). Though courts might occasionally serve as a defense 
against political efforts to subordinate people of color, on this 
score, "defeats are more likely than protection" (p. 189). Bell 
thus asks reformers to "defy the ... involuntary sacrifices and 
interest-convergence determinants" of racial practices by "forg-
ing fortuity" at the legislative level (p. 190). 
Forged fortuity is meant to circumvent the perils of judicial 
reform by seeking change democratically in the moments when 
the interests of people of color align with the interests of Whites 
(p. 190). Reformers in the 1950s forged fortuity by staging peace-
ful sit-ins at lunch counters in the segregated South. "The sit-ins 
taught us that a great many whites would not maintain discrimi-
natory policies if the cost was too high," Bell recalls (p. 190). He 
also provides the example of William Robert Ming, a black law-
with that 'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that [James) Madison 
believed improbable in a pluralistic society."' (quoting Frank I. Goodman, De Facto 
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 315 
(1972))); see also Brown, supra note 159, at 574 ("The government is not majoritarian 
and does not even come close to enabling pure majority preferences to prevail in the 
policymaking process."). 
163. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 (1962) ("(W)hen the pressure for imme-
diate results is strong enough and emotions ride high enough, [lawmakers] will ordinarily 
prefer to act on expediency rather than ... follow[] the path of principle .... "). 
164. See id. at 25. 
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yer from Chicago who, in the early 1960s, defended Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. against charges that he violated Alabama's state 
income tax laws by not reporting donations collected by the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference as his own personal 
income. Rather than portray the charges as retaliation for King's 
civil rights activities, Ming stacked the jury with White business 
owners and emphasized the far reaching tax implications of the 
government's argument to business interests generally. After just 
four hours of deliberations, the all-White jury acquitted King of 
the charges (p. 191). 
Contemporary examples of forged fortuity are visible in the 
work of political coalitions. Professor Michelle Allen, for exam-
ple, appeals to the self-interest of Whites as a way to build 
broad-based approval for public school integration which she 
says receives little support when billed as a vehicle for minority 
access.
165 Professor Sheryll Cashin writes about grass roots or-
ganizations that have mobilized "across the artificial lines of race 
and political jurisdiction" to obtain fair and equitable tax, trans-
portation, housing and education reform.166 Capitalizing on self-
interest may also open government employment opportunities to 
people of color in traditionally White-dominated fields. 167 The 
political hegemony of White constituencies simply cannot be sus-
tained in a pluralistic society. America's increasing diversity cre-
ates both the need and opportunity to appeal to multi-racial, 
multi-lingual, multi-faith coalitions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The need to forge fortuity takes into account the unfortu-
nate reality that racial justice is seldom made a government pri-
ority for its own sake. The strategy also is not without risk. Much 
like the judiciary, the legislative and executive position on race 
"ha[s] swung from unresponsive to hostile" (p. 137). Forged for-
tuity nonetheless presents the best likelihood for progressive re-
form in the face of racial resistance from Whites because it com-
pels cooperation from a multitude of diverse constituencies, 
165. See Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Pre-
sent, and Future, 47 How. L.J. 795,827-28 (2004). 
166. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ide-
ology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253,284--87 (2005). 
167. See Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter's Open Doors: What the University 
of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for Race-Conscious Government Decision-
making, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 543,566--69 (2005). 
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including some Whites. Perhaps more importantly, forged fortu-
ity might possibly induce the kinds of coveted long-term changes 
that passive fortuity has made impossible to achieve. Social sci-
entists have shown that orienting diverse groups of individuals 
towards a common goal can reduce the impact of racial preju-
dice.168 Coalition building does just that, and it therefore lays the 
groundwork for radically reconceptualizing a society where even 
forged fortuity may no longer be necessary to protect the practi-
cal interests and constitutional guarantees of marginalized racial 
groups. Thus, while Professor Bell submits evidence of racial for-
tuity to prove the permanence of racism (p. 78)/69 heeding his 
call to forged fortuity may be the first step in proving him wrong. 
168. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 197-200, quote at 199 (identifying benefits of 
integration to include "greater toleration of, and appreciation for, members of other ra-
cial backgrounds, a greater sense of civic and political engagement, and an increased de-
sire to live and work in multiracial settings as adults"); Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch, 
The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes, 
71 Soc. FORCES 781 (1993). 
169. See also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992) ("Black 
people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail 
as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victo-
ries that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white domi-
nance.") (emphasis omitted); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 67 at ix 
("(R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.:.). 
